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I. INTRODUCTION

As agricultural technology develops, new issues emerge. While
genetically engineered crops can increase yields and productivity, they can
also increase new legal concerns that had not previously existed. One such
concern is the comingling of non-engineered crops with genetically
engineered varieties. The corruption of plants that are not engineered is a
problem not only because of the loss of that original plant itself if the entire
plant population were to become comingled, but also because of the inability
to sell a crop that has been intended as a non-engineered crop when it is
infiltrated by genetically engineered material.
The infiltration of LLRICE60 1, a genetically engineered variety of rice,
into the U.S. rice supply is an example of the problems that can occur when
a regulated genetically engineered product is introduced into the nonengineered supply.' This piece will explore the events that gave rise to the
resulting litigation, the regulations that are in place to prevent such events,
and the remedies available when such an event occurs.

* B.A., University of Arkansas Honors College (2007), J.D., University of Arkansas
School of Law (2010), LL.M., University of Arkansas School of Law Program in
Agricultural & Food Law (2014).
1. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
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II. LIBERTY LINK LITIGATION

In January 2006, Riceland Foods, Inc., the largest miller and marketer
of rice in the world based in Stuttgart, Arkansas, discovered genetically
engineered material in some of its rice. 2 Although the United States
produces corn, soybeans, canola, and cotton with a genetically engineered
herbicide resistance trait, there is no domestic commercial production of
genetically engineered rice. 3 Accordingly, Riceland hypothesized that the
genetically engineered material could be residual fragments transferred from
the other genetically engineered crops that were transported in the same
containers or vehicles.4 Riceland collected rice samples from various
locations for testing, and the results indicated that several samples tested
positive for the herbicide resistance trait genetically engineered by Bayer
CropScience.
Bayer CropScience describes itself as "an innovation-driven company
with a long tradition in research and development."6 Bayer developed many
genetically engineered products for herbicide tolerance, and the engineered
protein in those products was called Liberty Link.7 Three of those products
were rice, and one of those rice varieties was LLRICE601, the regulated line
of genetically engineered rice found in the samples provided by Riceland.'
"Regulated" articles are defined as organisms that have been altered or
created by genetic engineering and can be considered "plant pests." 9 The
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS"), which is
responsible for protecting domestic agriculture from pests and diseases,
makes the determination of whether an article is regulated.'° Additionally,
an organism can become deregulated after a petition process and approval
2. Bill J. Reed, Statement Regarding Genetically Engineered Material in Rice (Aug.
18, 2006); see also Andrew Pollack, UnapprovedRice Strain Found in Wide Area, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/22/business/22rice.html?fta=y&_r=O.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Bayer: Sciencefor a Better Life, BAYER CROPSCIENCE,
http://www.cropscience.bayer.com/en/Company/Our-Mission.aspx (last updated Nov.
6,2013).
7. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
8. Id
9. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2014).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions, USDA.GOV,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=BIOTECHFAQ&navtype=R
T&parentnav=BIOTECH (last visited Sep. 28, 2014).
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from APHIS. 1 APHIS regulates genetically engineered organisms that could
threaten plant health through its Biotechnology Regulatory Services
12
program.
APHIS conducts two analyses in order to determine whether a
regulated article can be deregulated. 3 First, APHIS considers whether the
organism is a "plant pest," which is defined in the Plant Protection Act
15
("PPA")" 4 as anything that can "injure or damage plants or plant products.'
Second, if the organism is not a plant pest, then APHIS will move forward
with deregulation, which includes evaluating potential environmental
impacts. 16

Of Bayer's three genetically engineered rice products, none had been
commercialized, but two were deemed safe for consumption and deregulated
under the APHIS guidelines, LLRJCE62 and LLRICE06. 7 LLRICE60 1, the
genetically engineered rice found in Riceland's supply, was regulated. 8
On August 17, 2006, Bayer filed a petition with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture ("USDA") to deregulate LLRICE601, which would remove
liability for contamination. 9 The petition asserted that "[a]gronomic
evaluation has demonstrated that there were no morphological, beneficial
organism, disease susceptibility or pest susceptibility differences observed
when comparing the events to cultivated rice. 20° The following day, the

11. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, Permits,
Notifications, & Petitions, APHIS.USDA.GOV, http://www.aphis.usda.gov
(last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
12.

U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,

Biotechnology, APHIS.USDA.GOV,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology (last visited Sept.
28, 2014).
13. Press Release, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA Seeks
Public Review and Comment on Draft Environmental Impact Statement for HerbicideResistant Corn and Soybeans (Jan. 3, 2014), availableat http://www.usda.gov.
14. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012) (gives the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture the authority to issue regulations that prevent plant pests from
being introduced into or disseminated within the United States).
15. Press Release, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA Seeks
Public Review and Comment on Draft Environmental Impact Statement for HerbicideResistant Corn and Soybeans (Jan. 3, 2014), availableat http://www.usda.gov.
16. Id.
17. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
18. Id.
19. Petition of Bayer CropScience, LLRICE601 USDA Extension Petition, at 3 (Aug.
17, 2006).
20. Id.
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USDA announced that unapproved genetically engineered rice was detected
in commercial long grain rice.2
The USDA's release stated that both the USDA and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") "reviewed the available scientific data and
concluded that there [were] no human health, food safety, or environmental
concerns associated with this [genetically engineered] rice."22
The international backlash began two days later, when Japan banned
long grain rice from being imported from the United States ("U.S.").23 The
European Union ("EU") followed, and while the EU did not issue a long
grain rice import ban like Japan, it did require imported American long grain
rice to be certified as free from LLRICE601. 24 The certification required
rice to be tested at an accredited laboratory using validated testing methods
and a certificate issued guaranteeing the absence of the genetically
engineered rice.
Rice futures plummeted, eventually costing U.S. rice
farmers $150 million in lost profits.26
Rice producers across the country began filing lawsuits against Bayer.27
LLRICE601 was detected at levels of six grains per 10,000 in Cheniere rice,
a popular long grain rice in the country. 28 On November 14, 2006, the
Arkansas State Plant Board Seed Committee 29 unanimously voted to
recommend that Arkansas ban Cheniere rice from planting in 2007.30 Ten
days later, the USDA deregulated LLRICE601, issuing a "Finding of No

21.

Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns

Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
22. Id.
23. Japan bans 'contaminated' US rice, BBCNEWS.COM,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/science/nature/5271384.stm (Aug. 21, 2006).
24. Press Release, Commission requires certification of US rice exports to stop
unauthorized GMO entering the EU (Aug. 23, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1120.
25. Id.
26. Joe Whittington & Andrew M. Harris, Bayer Must Pay Farmersfor Contaminated
Rice Crop, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001 &sid=a8VxRrYyH6Ls.
27. Lawsuit filed over genetically modified rice, ARKANSASNEWS.COM (Aug. 29,
2006, 11:00 PM), http://archives.arkansasnews.com/2006/08/29/lawsuit-filed-overgenetically-modified-rice/.
28. David Bennett, No CL 131 rice in Arkansas in 2007, DELTA FARM PRESS (Mar. 5,
2007), http://deltafarmpress.com/no-cl- 131-rice-arkansas-2007.
29. In the interest of full disclosure, the author's father was the chairman of this
committee at the time of this vote.
30. David Bennett, No easy answers in clean-up of GM rice situation, DELTA FARM
PRESS (Nov. 21, 2006), http://deltafarmpress.com/no-easy-answers-clean-gm-ricesituation.
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Significant Impact" stating Bayer's petition for nonregulated status was
granted because deregulation "[would] not have a significant impact on the
quality of the human environment."3 1
Despite the deregulation of LLRICE601, the litigation had already
begun. And all rice-related cases against Bayer CropScience were ordered
to be consolidated.32 Plaintiffs in an action in the Eastern District of
Arkansas requested that the litigation be centered in that district, but the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation3 3 decided the action should be
located in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
due to the locations of other plaintiffs.3 4
At the time of consolidation, those actions consisted of seven cases in
the Eastern District of Arkansas, four in the Western District of Louisiana,
and two in the Eastern District of Missouri.3 5 The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the cases and stated that the actions,
"several of which are brought on behalf of nationwide, multistate or
statewide classes of rice farmers, allege negligence on the part of Bayer for
causing the contamination of commercial rice stocks with LLRICE601, a
variety of genetically modified rice."36
Judge Catherine D. Perry of the Eastern District of Missouri issued an
order titling the case In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation and set forth
schedules requiring class representatives to complete Plaintiff Fact Sheets
and serve initial disclosures.37

31. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,
FINDING OF No SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: EXTENSION OF NONREGULATED STATUS TO RICE

LINE LLRICE601 (Nov. 24, 2006).
32. Transfer Order, In re LLRICE 601 Contamination Litig., 466 F.Supp.2d 1351,
1352 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
33. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1407
to transfer civil actions involving common questions of fact to any district for
consolidated pretrial proceedings. The statute authorizes the panel to choose the district
that is convenient for parties and witnesses "and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions." Upon the panel's request, ajudge may be assigned temporarily
and can exercise the powers of a district judge in any district in order to consolidate the
pretrial proceedings. The statute provides two methods for transfer to be initiated: the
judicial panel can do so on its own initiative, or a party in any action who is seeking to
consolidate the proceedings may file a motion to do so in the district court where its own
action is pending. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2014).
34. Transfer Order, In re LLRICE 601 Contamination Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d 135152 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id at 1352.
37. Case Management Order No. 1, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, No.
4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2007).
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Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint on May 17, 2007. 3" In the
Complaint, Plaintiffs made numerous factual allegations, including that
Bayer knew LLRICE could contaminate the U.S. rice supply because Bayer
ded the same thing with the U.S. corn supply in the past.39 Plaintiffs also
alleged that Bayer contaminated the U.S. Rice Supply with LLRICE601,4 °
specifically the nationally popular Cheniere variety,4' and that the
contamination caused significant and continuing harm.42 Specifically,
Plaintiffs alleged that "U.S. rice export partners-including the EU, Japan,
Korea, Canada, Russia, and many other countries-[had] prohibited or
43
otherwise refused shipments of U.S. long-grain rice" as a result.
Additionally, restrictions imposed by those jurisdictions caused the price to
plummet in other jurisdictions.44 Plaintiffs also stated that the price of rice
futures dropped approximately fourteen percent upon the news of
contamination, consequential bans, and new testing requirements, and trend
analysis conducted by the U.S. Rice Producers Association indicated that as
a result of the contamination, the decline in prices in only two days cost
American rice producers roughly $150 million.4 5
The Complaint described the Defendants as "members of a single
business enterprise ("SBE") known generally as 'Bayer CropScience,' which
is organized and operated to achieve a common business purpose. "46 Bayer
CropScience and its collective Bayer defendants answered the Complaint on
June 21, 2007. 47 The Answer responded to the majority of the Complaint's
allegations by stating that the Bayer defendants were "without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations...
'4 8
and therefore deny the same."

38.

Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Genetically Modified Rice

Litigation, No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. May 17, 2007).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id. at 32.
43. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, In re Genetically Modified Rice
Litigation, No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP at 11 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2010).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Answer and Defenses of Bayer CropScience LP, Bayer CropScience Holding
Inc., Bayer CropScience LLC, Bayer CropScience Inc., and Bayer Corporation to
Plaintiffs' Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Genetically Modified Rice
Litigation, No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2007).
48. Id. at 2-6.
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The litigation lasted for two more years before the first verdict was
reached.49 On December 4, 2009, a jury awarded almost $2 million in
compensatory damages to two Missouri farmers.50 The farmers' attorneys
had requested punitive damages, stating that an $80 million punitive
judgment was "not too much to send a message," but the jury rejected that
request.5 The following February, a federal jury ordered Bayer to pay $1.5
million in compensatory damages to farmers in Arkansas and Mississippi,
again declining to award punitive damages.52
Judge Perry ruled that plaintiffs were not allowed to seek damages for
emotional distress, pointing out that they made no claim for physical injuries,
they did not specifically request emotional distress damages, and they only
stated they would seek damages for emotional distress at the final pretrial
conference four days before trial, citing lack of notice under Rule 953 as the
basis for her decision.54
The first award of punitive damages occurred on March 8, 2010, when
Bayer was ordered to pay $532,643 in compensatory damages and $500,000
in punitive damages to an Arkansas farmer. 55 From there, punitive awards
increased dramatically; for example, the following month twelve Arkansas
farmers were awarded $5.9 million in compensatory damages and $42
million in punitive damages.56 In July 2010, a Louisiana farmer was awarded

49. Joe Whittington & Andrew M. Harris, Bayer Must Pay Farmersfor Contaminated
2009),
4,
(Dec.
BLOOMBERG.COM
Crop,
Rice
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adGubJZ2] Uzo.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bayer Crop Science loses another case in genetic rice dispute,
WRALTECHWIRE.COM,

http://wraltechwire.com/business/tech-wire/news/blogpost/6981094/ (last updated Feb.
7, 2010, 2:25 PM).
53. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) states, "If an item of special damage is
claimed, it must be specifically stated."
54. Memorandum and Order, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, No. 4:06
MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2010).
55. Alison Sider, Bayer Orderedto Pay Farmer$1 Million in Tab for Modified Rice,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.saynotogmos.org/ud20l0/umar10b.php.
56. Jan Cottingham, Update:RicelandAwarded $136.8 Million In Suit Against Bayer
Cropscience, ARKANSAS BUSINESS (March 19, 2011, 3:15 am), available at
http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/34865/update-riceland-awarded-1368million-in-suit-against-bayer-cropscience. Bayer CropScience LP et al. v. Schafer, 2011
Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822 (affirming the jury's verdict and the amount of damages
awarded).
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$500,248 in damages, and in August 2010, six Arkansas farmers were
awarded $940,000 in damages.57
. Bayer settled for the first time in October 2010, agreeing to pay three
Texas farmers $290,000 and avoid going to trial. 8 At this time, a jury has
yet to find in favor of Bayer CropScience.
11. ANALYSIS
In reviewing the facts leading up to the LLRICE601 infiltration into the
U.S. rice supply and the subsequent litigation, two primary questions arise.
First, how can infiltration be prevented? Second, what is the appropriate
remedy when infiltration occurs? This analysis will evaluate prevention
through regulation of genetically engineered crops and consider remedy
through available nuisance law causes of action.
A. PreventingInfiltration:Regulating Genetically EngineeredCrops
According to the USDA, the Coordinated Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology, established as formal policy in 1986, "describes the
Federal system for evaluating products developed using modem
biotechnology."59 The Coordinated Framework synthesizes the existing laws
that apply to biotechnology ("biotech") related products. 60 Those laws and
regulations come from the APHIS, FDA, and Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA").6 1
In the Framework are numerous regulations, and in the LLRICE601
situation, the most applicable is found at Title 7, Part 340 of the Code of
Federal Regulations and is titled, "Introduction of Organisms and Products

57. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Loses Fifth Straight Trial Over
U.S. Rice Crops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 14, 2010), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=newsarchive&sid=axmCsYlz4h 1c.
Stephanie K. Jones, $750M Settlement Reached with U.S. Farmers over Genetically
Modified Rice, Insurance Journal (July 7, 2011), availableat
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2011/07/07/205488.htm.
58. Alison Frankel, BayerAgrees to 'Watershed' Settlement in 7,000-CaseRice Crop
ContaminationLitigation, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.theamericanlawyer.com.
59.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,

Regulations. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology? 1dmy&urile=wc
m%3apath%3a%2FAPHISContent Library%2FSAOurFocus%2FSABiotechnolo
gy%2FSARegulations%2F (last modified Jan. 30, 2014).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or
Which There Is Reason to Believe Are Plant Pests"; 62 this particular
provision in the Code of Federal Regulations was introduced in 1987.63 It
was revised in 1993, when a provision was added for a notification process
for the introduction of certain plants with which APHIS had experience. The
1993 revision also added a petition process to allow certain plants to be
deregulated.64 In 1997, it was again revised when amendments were added
to allow regulated articles to be introduced under notification procedure and
enable APHIS to extend nonregulated status to regulated articles if closely
related to an organism that was already determined as nonregulated. 65 The
1997 revisions also simplified procedures for introduction of genetically
engineered organisms, requirements for nonregulated status, and procedures
for reporting of field tests. 66 The provision was revised most recently in
2001, when the regulation changed to reflect the enactment of the Plant
Protection Act and removed references to plant protection and quarantine
statutes that no longer existed as a result of the PPA.67 The statute was the
subject of proposed amendments in 2009,68 arguably as a result of the
LLRICE601 litigation. However, after an open comment period and a public
meeting held by APHIS for feedback on the proposed amendments, those
amendments did not come into effect.69 Over four thousand comments were
submitted, many of them consistent with one comment that states, "the
current proposed rule does little to close the loopholes in the regulations the

62. 7 C.F.R. pt. 340 (1987).
63. Id.
64. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the
Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 58 Fed.
Reg. 17044-01 (Mar. 31, 1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
65. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Simplification of Requirements
and Procedures for Genetically Engineered Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg. 23945-01 (May 2,
1997) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
66. Id.
67. Plant Protection Act; Revisions to Authority Citations, 66 Fed. Reg. 21049 (Apr.
27, 2001).
68. Keller & Heckman LLP, USDA APHIS Proposes Amendments to Regulations
Regarding Genetically EngineeredOrganisms, KELLER AND HECKMAN ALERT (July 14,

2009), available at http://www.khlaw.com/3092.
69. Id.; Plant Protection Act; Revisions to Authority Citations; Technical
Amendment, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,265 (Mar. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330).
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rule is designed to replace and it creates more gaps than it fills."7 ° The
regulation stands as last amended in 2001." 1
The regulations in 7 C.F.R. pt. 340 can be circumvented by petitioning
APHIS to grant "nonregulated status" to a genetically engineered
organism. 72 Comingling an approved or "deregulated" genetically
engineered crop with another crop does not create risks for health or the
environment.73 Because the deregulated crop itself has been approved by a
regulatory system, for example, APHIS, the deregulated crop has been
determined to be safe.74 It follows that the safe deregulated crop comingled
with a non-engineered crop would also be safe; however, the same assurance
cannot be applied to a regulated crop. If a regulated crop is comingled with
a non-engineered crop, potential economic, health, and environmental
concerns may arise.75
While health and environmental risks are addressed by federal
regulations and approval procedures, economic impact of biotech crops is an
emerging issue with fewer established guidelines. 76 The LLRICE601
litigation provides the early framework for eventual economic parameters
that will control future biotech commingling issues.
Many authors who encountered this topic before the litigation's
resolution forecast such a result. In their article "Litigating the Economic
Impacts of Biotech Crops," Thomas P. Redick and A. Bryan Endres
predicted that the "economic loss doctrine" might foreclose tort recovery for
rice farmers who purchased, albeit unknowingly, seed that was already
contaminated because they could have required a contract provision assuring
that the seed was not genetically engineered. 77 In another piece,

70. Angela Robinson, Comment on the APHIS Proposed Rule, REGULATIONS.GOV
(May 11, 2009), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2008-00235374.
71. Plant Protection Act; Revisions to Authority Citations; Technical Amendment, 69
Fed. Reg. 12,265 (Mar. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330).
72. Keller & Heckman LLP, USDA APHIS Proposes Amendments to Regulations
Regarding Genetically EngineeredOrganisms, KELLER AND HECKMAN ALERT (July 14,
2009), available at http://www.khlaw.com/3092.
73. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
PrecautionaryContainment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 210 (2008).
74. See Drew L. Kershen, Legal Liability Issues in AgriculturalBiotechnology,
NAT'L AGRIC. L. CTR., Nov. 2002, at 7, available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/kershen biotech.pdf.
75. D. L. Uchtmann, StarLinkTM - A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159,198 (2002).
76. Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Litigating the Economic Impacts of
Biotech Crops, 22 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 24, 24 (2008).
77. Id.
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"Coexistence Through Contracts: Export-Oriented Stewardship in
Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's Precautionary Containment,"
Redick identified the conflict between the defendant's argument that the
experimental contaminant was later deregulated and the plaintiff's argument
that the economic harm was already incurred despite LLRICE601 later being
approved.78 To elaborate, the plaintiffs position that the harm was already
incurred is the result of financial harm that was sustained before the plant
was deregulated; subsequent deregulation would not have changed the fact
that when the crop was initially contaminated, it instantly failed to meet the
standards of other countries that regulate the genetically modified crops
imported from the United States. 79 Countries responded by demanding an
expensive certification processes or halting importation altogether, both of
which caused rice revenue to drop dramatically.8" Therefore it follows that
deregulating the contaminating matter after the fact would have no effect on
the economic losses that was already.
Prevention can be improved through review of the pertinent
regulations, negotiation of particular seed contracts, and voluntary effort on
the part of producers of genetically engineered seed, as well as those who
cultivate it. With stronger attention paid to prevention, remedy may be less
frequently necessary.
B. Remedying Infiltration:Nuisance Law
The LLRICE601 litigation is an example of how the current regulations
do not always prevent the harm of comingling. Although Bayer was subject
to 7 C.F.R. pt. 340, LLRICE601 still made its way into the food supply.
Accordingly, if regulating genetically engineered crops is the best method to
prevent comingling, nuisance laws and regulations may be an alternative to
address harm once it has already happened. It is here that the law may be
able to strike a balance between preventing prospective harm versus a
remedy for actual harm.
Importantly, not every plaintiff will be able to recover under a nuisance
claim. In Sample v. Monsanto Co., a biotech crop that was approved for use
in the U.S., but not in the European Union, infiltrated the supply.8' Plaintiffs'
claims were for lost revenue because the EU boycotted American soybeans
and corn after the contamination; however, the plaintiffs own property was

78.

Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:

Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs.
PrecautionaryContainment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 212 (2008).

California's

79. See generally id.
80. See generally id.
81. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
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not contaminated or injured.82 Accordingly, the economic loss doctrine
precluded a nuisance claim.83 A grower whose non-engineered crop is
affected may have to demonstrate a physical injury in order to meet nuisance
law standards.84
However, the economic loss doctrine differs from state to state. For
example, Arkansas does not have the economic loss rule.85 The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that pure economic losses are covered by strict tort
liability.8 6 Interpreting Arkansas law, federal courts have upheld the
approach that recovery under strict liability is permitted by Arkansas law
"even when the only damages sustained are to the defective product itself."87
Since many of the plaintiffs in the LLRICE601 litigation were Arkansas
farmers, this important distinction shaped the recovery not only in this
litigation, but also in future application of these precedents.
C. Prevention or Punishment
While punitive damages might deter companies like Bayer
CropScience from future unintended comingling, it is unclear how effective
punitive damages are at curbing future incidents. How much money in
punitive damages is enough to change Bayer's future behavior? Bayer
CropScience reports its 2013 annual net income as E3.2 billion, which is an
increase of 32.7% over their previous annual net income for 2012.88 At an
exchange rate of 1 Dollar to 1.37 Euro, Bayer's 2013 annual net income is
approximately $4.39 billion.
In the first award of punitive damages resulting from LLRICE601
litigation, Bayer was ordered to pay $500,000,89 which is .0114 percent of
Bayer's annual net income. To put that in context, if Bayer operates a 40hour workweek for 52 weeks a year, it takes the company just under 15

82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
PrecautionaryContainment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 220 (2008).
85. Glenn S. Ritter, Economic Loss Rule in Arkansas: Everyone Else Has It, Why
Don't We?,64 ARK. L. REV. 455, 456 (2011).
86. Blagg v.Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Ark.1981).
87. Alaskan Oil, Inc. v.Cent. Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553, 555 (8th Cir. 1992).
88. Continuous Growth in Bayer's Anniversary Year, BAYERCROPSCIENCE.COM,
http://www.annualreport2013.bayer.com/en/overview.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014).
89. Alison Sider, Bayer Orderedto Pay Farmer$1 Million Is Tab for Modified Rice,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.gpplaw.com/settlements.html.
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minutes to make $500,000. 90 This amount did not persuade Bayer to settle
its remaining cases, as it proceeded to trial on the next case, in which twelve
farmers were awarded punitive damages of $42 million,9 1 amounting to .96
percent of Bayer's annual net income. Bayer then began to settle, offering
$290,000 to avoid trial.92

The question of punitive damage significance has been addressed with
large companies before. Courts have handled "pain and suffering" damages
that functioned more like punitive damages against the pharmaceutical
company Janssen. 93 Similarly, Ford Motor Co. was ordered to pay $52

million in punitive damages for "punishment and deterrence. 9 4 The question
remains whether these awards are more than a mere slap on the wrist or
actually cause large corporations to reevaluate their approaches. The
Supreme Court has stated punitive damages are often "wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused." 95
IV. CONCLUSION

The commingling of genetically engineered crops with non-engineered
crops can be addressed by two different approaches: prevention and
punishment. Prevention is most likely to manifest itself in the form of
regulations, while punishment is best meted out by the imposition ofpunitive
damages. Ideally, an effective regulatory scheme would lead to adequate
prevention and make punishment the exception, rather than the rule.
However, in those cases where preventative methods have failed, a standard
of punishment should be in place to deter similar conduct in the future.
These two methods can work in tandem to reduce the risk of commingling.
A regulatory framework, whether a new scheme or the current
regulations that are in effect, may be bolstered by strict consequences for
those who fail to adhere. It is important that regulations not create an undue
burden on the very entities they are designed to protect. As demonstrated by

90. Calculated by 40 hours per week, multiplied by 52 weeks per year, then divide
$4.39 billion per year by that amount, which comes to $2,110,576.92 per hour; divide
$500,000 by that amount & multiply that by 60 minutes to determine that it takes Bayer
14.214 minutes to generate $500,000.
91. Alison Frankel, BayerAgrees to 'Watershed'Settlement in 7, 000-Case Rice Crop
Contamination Litigation, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.theamericanlawyer.com.
92. Id.
93. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 65-6 (2002).
94. $52 Million PunitivesNeededfor 'PunishmentandDeterrence,' Plaintiffs Say, 25
No. 19 Andrews Automotive Litig. Rep. 3 at 2 (2006).
95. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
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the Liberty Link contamination, an overly restrictive regulatory system can
add expense and negatively affect agribusinesses that are forced to comply
with extensive, and expensive, certification requirements or other
burdensome measures. Rather than create extra regulations that impose upon
those who have not yet transgressed, a minimally restrictive regulatory
framework should provide protection through prevention and rely on
significant punishment to motivate compliance.
This means that punitive damages must go beyond a mere slap on the
wrist. Punitive damages in these accidental contamination cases must be
severe enough that companies are compelled to take more care and avoid
commingling. In the litigation surrounding Liberty Link rice, the first two
judgments did not include punitive damages.96 While the compensatory
damages were high at $2 million for two farmers in Missouri and $1.5
million for three farmers in Arkansas and one in Mississippi, the damages
made up for the farmers' losses, but did not impose any type of punishment
on Bayer CropScience. 97 It was not until punitive damages were awarded
that Bayer began making settlement offers.98 Even then, the first award of
punitive damages was for $500,000, which takes Bayer less than 15 minutes
to generate. 99 While those are technically punitive damages, they are not of
the severity that would cause Bayer to adjust its behavior to prevent future
incidents.
Substantial prevention through knowledge of potential punishment can
only be effectuated by high punitive damages. While punitive damages can
vary and sometimes have little relationship to the value of compensatory
damages, genetically engineered crop contamination is one example of a
type of case in which a direct relationship to economic loss should be a
secondary consideration. Rather than focusing on the loss of the plaintiff,
punitive damages should be implemented with the purpose of deterring not
only that specific defendant, but also future potential defendants from
making the same costly errors.
Not every defendant should be punished with crippling punitive
damages, and it does no good to annihilate an otherwise viable business by
forcing it to pay exorbitant punitive damages. However, the damages are not
punitive if they can be generated in 15 minutes of company time. The later
verdict of $42 million in punitive damages awarded to Arkansas farmers with

96. Whittington & Harris, supra note 49.
97. Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Jury Verdict Against Bayer for Liberty
Link Rice Breaks New Ground in Biotech Liability,26 AGRIC. LAW UPDATE 2, 2 (2009).
98. Frankel, supra note 91.
99. See calculations in footnote 90.
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$5.9 million in compensatory damages illustrates a better solution for the
type of punishment that will lead to future prevention. l0 0
The litigation surrounding LLRICE601 provides an unprecedented
opportunity to evaluate both preventative and punitive measures to ensure
that non-engineered crops are protected while genetically engineered crops
are experimentally developed. With the proper preventative regulations,
coupled with appropriate punitive responses, both types of crops can
continue to coexist in a marketplace that has increasing demand for each.

100.

Cottingham, supra note 56.

